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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
ROBERT P. HAGEN, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions are presented for review: 
1. Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that 
this Court could not reach a decision in State v. Perank, Case 
No. 860196, a pending case, contrary to Ute Indian Tribe v. State 
of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 
479 U.S. 994 (1986), that would have any practical effect? 
2. Did the court of appeals erroneously refuse to 
remand defendant's case to the trial court for reconsideration of 
the jurisdictional question under a correct allocation of proof 
and a proper standard of proof? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on November 
23, 1990, and appears in State v. Hagen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 
(Utah Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1990) (a copy of the opinion is contained 
in the addendum). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the questions presented for review is 
contained in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert P. Hagen, was charged with 
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 1). 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to 
the charge (R. 33, 36-43). Prior to sentencing, defendant filed 
a motion to arrest judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, 
challenging the court's jurisdiction on the basis that he was an 
Indian who had allegedly committed a crime in Indian country and 
thus was subject to federal court jurisdiction only (R. 53-58). 
At the evidentiary hearing on his motion to arrest 
judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant presented the 
following evidence in an effort to establish that he was an 
Indian for purposes of avoiding state criminal jurisdiction: 
(1) that defendant had lived on Indian reservations all his life, 
attending their schools and using their hospitals (T. 4); (2) 
that he had lived on the Uintah Indian Reservation for the past 
six or seven years, attending some of the Ute Tribe's business 
meetings and nearly all of their pow wows (T. 5-6); (3) that 
although he is not a member of the Ute Tribe, he is a member of 
the Little Shell Tribe of the Chippewa Indians, a tribe which is 
not recognized by the federal government (T. 7; Def. Ex. 3 & 4); 
(4) that he had received money distributed from a fund 
administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)—a fund that 
had been created pursuant to a money judgment won by various 
bands of the Pembina Chippewa Indians (T. 6-8; Def. Ex. 2); (5) 
that he had received free health care from the Indian Health 
Service (IHS) his entire life (T. 10); and (6) that he had 
5/16ths Indian blood (T. 11). 
In a brief cross-examination of defendant, the State 
established that defendant had no Ute Indian blood; that his 
mother, although an Indian, was not an enrolled member of any 
tribe; that his father was not an Indian; that he had a 
grandmother who was an Indian and a grandfather who was half-
Indian; and that he received no benefits in Utah other than the 
free health care from IHS (T. 11-13). The State presented no 
independent evidence. 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion, sentenced him to a term of zero to five years 
in the Utah State Prison, and ordered him to pay various fines 
and restitution (R. 61, 63-64; T. 25-26). 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed defendant's 
conviction and ordered him discharged, concluding that (1) under 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), Myton, Utah was 
Defendant qualified this by indicating that he also was 
receiving money from the BIA every year (T. 13). 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation, and that the Utah Supreme Court could not reach a 
contrary decision in State v. Perank, Case No. 860196, a pending 
case; (2) the trial court had applied an incorrect burden and 
standard of proof in ruling that defendant was not an Indian for 
jurisdictional purposes; and (3) remand to the trial court for a 
determination of defendant's Indian status under a correct 
allocation of the burden of proof and a proper standard of proof 
was not appropriate. State v. Hagen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah 
Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THIS COURT COULD NOT REACH A DECISION IN 
STATE V. PERANK, CASE NO. 860196, A PENDING 
CASE, CONTRARY TO UTE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE 
OF UTAH, 773 F.2D 1087 (10TH CIR. 1985) (EN 
BANC), CERT. DENIED, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), 
THAT WOULD HAVE ANY PRACTICAL EFFECT. 
In the trial court the State argued as one alternative 
basis for jurisdiction in state court that Myton, Utah is not 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation 
(T. 18). In ruling that it had jurisdiction over defendant, the 
trial court did not address that question, basing its decision 
solely on its determination that defendant was not an Indian (T. 
25). 
In Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 
(10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Myton was within the 
exterior boundaries of the reservation. However, the issue of 
whether Myton is actually within the exterior boundaries of the 
reservation is currently before this Court in State v. Perankf 
Case No. 860196. The State noted this fact to the court of 
appeals in the instant case and suggested that the court wait for 
a decision in Perank before issuing an opinion. The State argued 
that if this Court were to conclude in Perank that Myton is not 
within the reservation, there would be no question the trial 
court had criminal jurisdiction over defendant. Br. of Appellee 
at 4-5. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-
49 (1973); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 459 (7th Cir.) 
(state court has jurisdiction to punish an Indian who commits a 
crime off the reservation and within state territory), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984). Nevertheless, the court of appeals 
concluded: 
The Tenth Circuit's decision does not appear 
to hold open any role for the state courts in 
refining its holding in Ute Indian Tribe. 
While we have not been acquainted with the 
precise arguments advanced by the state in 
Perank, we are hard-pressed to see how, given 
the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, our state courts could 
reach a contrary decision that would have any 
practical effect. Seeing no possibility of 
an effective decision in Perank contrary to 
the result in Ute Indian Tribe, we see no 
reason to await the Perank decision, 
especially since defendant is presently 
incarcerated. 
State v. Haqen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 44 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 23, 
1990). 
This conclusion is contrary to the clear import of a 
number of decisions from other jurisdictions—i.e., that this 
Court is entitled to its own view on reservation status. See, 
e.g., State v. Janisf 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982); Stankey v. 
Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1977). Indeed, certiorari was 
granted by the United States Supreme Court in both DeCoteau v. 
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1975), and Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984), because the Supreme Court of 
South Dakota had reached a different result than had the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals on whether a reservation had been 
disestablished. See also State v. Perank, Case No. 860196, Br. 
of Respondent at 5-7. And, for the reasons argued in its brief 
to this Court in Perank, the State's position is that the Tenth 
Circuit incorrectly concluded in Ute Indian Tribe that Myton is 
within the reservation. 
By considering the Utah state courts bound by the 
decision in Ute Indian Tribe, the court of appeals decided an 
important question of law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court. See Utah R. App. P. 46(d). Accordingly, 
certiorari should be granted to review the court of appeals' 
decision that this Court cannot decide Perank in a manner 
contrary to Ute Indian Tribe and that Myton is therefore within 
the reservation. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO 
REMAND DEFENDANT'S CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL 
QUESTION UNDER A CORRECT ALLOCATION OF THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND A PROPER STANDARD OF 
PROOF. 
In the court of appeals, the State conceded that the 
trial court had incorrectly placed the burden on defendant to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was an Indian, 
acknowledging that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1990) the 
State had the ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction (i.e., that 
defendant was not an Indian) by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Hagen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44; Br. of Appellee at 5-9. The 
State then requested that defendant's case be remanded to the 
trial court for a determination of defendant's indian status 
under a correct allocation of proof and a proper standard of 
proof. Ibid. This request was premised on the fact that both 
the trial court and prosecutor had proceeded under a 
misinterpretation of the law in an area that had not yet been 
settled by a Utah appellate court (i.e., what burden and standard 
of proof applied to the Indian status question for purposes of 
state criminal jurisdiction). Furthermore, the question of 
Indian status for jurisdictional purposes is a question of fact 
which is most appropriately determined by the trial court. See 
United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d at 457 (Indian status for 
jurisdiction is a question of fact on which the government 
carries the burden). 
The court of appeals rejected the State's request for a 
remand on the grounds that, given the evidence developed in the 
trial court, the State simply could not carry its burden of 
establishing jurisdiction, and that the State is not "entitled to 
a second chance to put on evidence addressed to the 
jurisdictional issue." 148 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45. On the latter 
point, the Court stated that "[w]hen reversal results from the 
failure of the state to prove jurisdiction, further trial 
proceedings are not in order; [o]n the contrary, the conviction 
is reversed and the defendant is ordered discharged." Ibid, 
(citing State v. Sorenson# 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)). This suggests that the court of appeals considered 
further proceedings to be barred on double jeopardy grounds. 
However, such a conclusion is inconsistent with authority from 
other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State v. Miller, 47 Ohio App.3d 
113, 547 N.E.2d 399 (1988); State v. Lovef 5 Kan.App.2d 768, 625 
P.2d 7 (1981); State v. Russo# 70 Wis.2d 169, 233 N.W.2d 485 
(1975), and with the plain language of section 76-1-501(3) which 
explicitly states that the existence of jurisdiction is not an 
element of the crime. 
Thus, in refusing to remand defendant's case pursuant 
to the State's request, the court of appeals decided an important 
question of law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this Court. Accordingly, certiorari should be granted to review 
the court of appeals' ruling on the remand issue. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c^^^day of January, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Harry 
Souvall, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, for forwarding 
to Robert P. Hagen, Defendant-Respondent, whose address is not 
known to the State, this <*& day of January, 1991. 
ADDENDUM 
I do not believe the issue will forever evade 
review unless this court addresses the issue in a 
case that is moot. It is only for this reason 
that I do not view it as proper to decide the 
merits of the instant cases under the exception 
to the mootness doctrine. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Cite as 
148 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 
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Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme. 
Sitting in Vernal, Utah1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction on the 
narrow ground that the crime for which he 
was convicted, selling marijuana, was comm-
itted at Myton, Utah, a location within the 
territorial confines of the Uintah and Ouray 
Indian Reservation, and that the state failed to 
establish the court's jurisdiction over him 
when it failed to prove he is not an Indian 
when confronted with his claim that he is. See, 
e.g., State v. St. Francis, 151 Vt. 3B4, 563 
A.2d 249, 251 (1989) ("If defendants are 
'Indians' and the crimes were committed 
within 'Indian country,' then Vermont has no 
jurisdiction over defendants."); People v. 
Luna, 683 P.2d 362, 365 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1984) (state lacks jurisdiction to prosecute 
Indian defendants for alleged sale and distri-
bution of controlled substances in "Indian 
country"). 
The state concedes on appeal that the trial 
court erred in requiring defendant to prove, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that he is in 
fact an Indian. The state properly concedes 
that the prosecution was required to prove 
jurisdiction, i.e., that defendant was not an 
Hagen CODE#CO 
Jv. Rep. 44 Provo.Utah 
Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Sorenson, 758 
P.2d 466,469-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The state advances two arguments against 
reversal notwithstanding these concessions. 
First, it suggests that the precise question of 
whether Myton is really within the confines of 
the reservation is presently before the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Perank, 
No. 860196, and that we should defer our 
consideration of this case until the decision in 
that case is issued. Second, it argues that we 
should remand, either to let the trial court 
reassess the evidence before it with the matters 
of burden of proof and evidentiary standard 
correctly in mind or, preferably, to give the 
state the chance to put on additional jurisdi-
ctional evidence since its failure to put on 
sufficient evidence resulted from an honest 
mistake on its part, shared by the trial court, 
concerning who had the burden of proof on 
defendant's claimed Indian status. 
Both arguments may be summarily dealt 
with. The federal courts, construing federal 
statutes, federal regulations, and federal 
Indian policy, have determined that Myton is 
within the confines of the reservation. See Ute 
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 
(10th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 994 (1986). See also Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. 
Utah 1981) (map appended to court's opinion 
depicts Myton as being well within both 
present and historical boundaries of Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation). The Tenth Circuit's 
decision does not appear to hold open any role 
for the state courts in refining its holding in Ute 
Indian Tribe. While we have not been 
acquainted with the precise arguments adva-
nced by the state in Perank, we are hard-
pressed to see how, given the Supremacy 
Clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
our state courts could reach a contrary deci-
sion that would have any practical effect. 
Seeing no possibility of an effective decision in 
Perank contrary to the result in Ute Indian 
Tribe, we see no reason to await the Perank 
decision, especially since defendant is presently 
incarcerated. 
Nor would remand be appropriate. The only 
testimony concerning whether defendant is an 
Indian is that which was offered by defendant 
himself. Defendant testified that he has lived 
on Indian reservations all his life, that he has 
attended reservation schools and been treated 
at reservation hospitals, that he is a member 
of the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 
that he had received proceeds from a judg-
ment entered in favor of various bands of the 
Chippewas pursuant to a distribution made by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and that his 
ancestry is 5/16ths Indian . Cross-
examination established that defendant was 
not a Ute, that he was not actually "enrolled" 
in any tribe, and that his father was not an 
CODE* CO 
Provo, Utah 
Indian. Under the applicable test,3 there is 
simply no way this evidence could be 
'weighed" by the trial court to come to the 
conclusion that the state had met its burden of 
proving jurisdiction by proving that defendant 
is not an Indian. Indeed, even if the court 
chose to discredit defendant's testimony 
completely, the result would be that there is 
no evidence in the record at all concerning 
defendant's Indian or non-Indian status. The 
state simply could not meet its burden in the 
absence of any evidence establishing jurisdic-
tion. 
Nor is the state entitled to a second chance 
to put on evidence addressed to the jurisdict-
ional issue. When reversal results from the 
failure of the state to prove jurisdiction, 
further trial proceedings are not in order. On 
the contrary, the conviction is reversed and the 
defendant is ordered discharged. See, e.g., 
Sorcnson, 758 P.2d at 470. We have not been 
shown that any exception exists where the 
failure of proof stems from a good-faith 
mistake on the part of the prosecution.5 
Defendant's conviction is reversed and he is 
ordered discharged. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Oral argument in this case was heard in Vernal, 
Utah. This court has frequently sat in locations 
other than the court's facility in Salt Lake City, as 
permitted by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-5 (1987). 
To date, panels of the court have heard argument in 
both Vernal and Richfield on two separate occas-
ions, as well as in Logan, Brigham City, Cedar City, 
St. George, Fillmore, and Manti. The cases heard 
'on circuit" typically arose in the general area, and 
often one or both attorneys reside in the area. 
Clients who might otherwise have to pay for an 
attorney's time in traveling to Salt Lake City can be 
spared that expense. Parties who might not be able 
to come to Salt Lake to hear their cases argued can 
often do so in their own or a nearby community. 
School classes have occasionally attended our proc-
eedings. Local sheriffs and court personnel have 
invariably been cooperative and, with the exception 
of an occasional glitch with unfamiliar recording 
equipment and one instance of a motel operator 
mistaking us for dog-show judges, our sessions 
outside Salt Lake have come off without incident. 
The court remains firm in its commitment to hold 
sessions throughout the state, as local caseloads 
warrant and our own calendaring demands permit. 
2. 
Two elements must be satisfied before it 
can be found that (a defendant] is an 
Indian under federal law. Initially, it 
must appear that he has a significant 
percentage of Indian blood. Secondly, 
the [defendant] must be recognized as an 
Indian either by the federal government 
or by some tribe or society of Indians. -
Cofonh v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Grim. 
1982). Five-sixteenths Indian blood clearly qualifies 
45 
as a 'significant percentage," the historical debate 
treated in the cases focusing on whether two-
nxteenths is enough. See, e.g., Sully v. United 
States, 195 F. 113 (8th Or. 1912) (one-eighth 
Indian blood is sufficient); ViaJpando v. State, 640 
P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982) (one-eighth Indian blood 
not sufficient). The "recognition" requirement is 
more fluid. See, e.g., St. Cloud v. United States, 
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D. S.D. 1988) (factors to 
consider include government provision of "assistance 
reserved only to Indians," receiving "benefits of 
tribal affiliation," living on a reservation). Formal 
enrollment in a federally recognized tribe is not 
required. Id. 
3. We assume the vast majority of instances where 
the prosecution fails to meet its burden to prove 
jurisdiction results from some honest mistake on its 
part concerning its burden and how to meet it. 
T DPPriBTS 
